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suggests he may have worried about payment for his services. In a
somewhat different case, but similar circumstances, it was held a
question for the jury whether the doctor's refusal to treat the patient
who owed him money was legal justification for abandonment. 5
It is an accepted rule, that where evidence is so clear and convincing that reasonable minds could not differ in their conclusions,
the question of the defendant's guilt or innocence is for the court, not
for the jury.6 In this case the court left to the jury the question
whether or not the defendant's conduct was a breach of his duty to the
decedent. This decision was in accordance with an earlier decision
of the court which held that a surgeon was not negligent as a matter
in shock and
of law in leaving the hospital while the patient was still
7
obviously in critical condition following an operation.
There is no doubt but that the court was correct in reversing the
directed verdict for the defendant. All the elements necessary in
constituting malpractice through abandonment are evident in this
case. Even though the court could not rule as a matter of law that
the defendant was guilty of dereliction of his duty, the remanding
of the case for another trial will afford ample opportunity for the
jury to find for the plaintiff.
Scotty Baesler

CONTRAcrs-ADAMS v. LINDSELL RuLE-UNJUsTm'r
ON Loss OF

SIGNIFICANCE PLACED

CONmOL.-Appellants, as purchasers, executed a con-

tract for the sale and purchase of certain property and mailed the
contract to appellees. Appellees executed the contract and mailed it
to appellants' attorney. After mailing the contract, but prior to its
receipt, appellees called appellants' attorney and cancelled the contract. Appellants nevertheless recorded the contract upon its receipt.
Appellees sought to have the appellants enjoined from making any
claim under the recorded land purchase contract. Appellants counterclaimed, seeking specific performance. The lower court entered a
summary decree for the appellees. Held: Reversed. Where an offer
is by mail the letter of acceptance completes the contract the moment
it is posted. Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1963).
The principal case is not unusual because of any departure from
well-established contract law, but because of the thorough discussion
given the "Adams v. Lindsell Doctrine." The arguments both for and
5Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307, 64 P.2d 208 (1937).

6Droppelman v. Willingham, 293 Ky. 614, 169 S.W.2d 811, 814 (1943).
Engle v. Clarke, 846 S.W.2d 13 (Ky. 1961).
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against the doctrine are explored with clarity and conciseness. Especially commendable is the refutation of the "loss of control" argument
advanced by many opponents of the rule in recent years. The purpose
of this comment is to synthesize that refutation.
One of the basic principles in contract law is that acceptance
does not take effect in bilateral contracts until the return promise is
communicated.' An exception to this rule was established in one of
the first cases involving a contract by correspondence; 2 where the
offer is by mail the letter of acceptance completes the contract the
moment it is posted. The case by which this exceptional doctrine is
known was decided in 1818 and according to one authority,3 the
doctrine has become so universally accepted in the law that criticism
is academic.
Nevertheless, the water has been muddied by modem postal
regulations which permit the sender to apply for a letter which he has
put in the mail. When the letter is properly identified, the postmaster
is required to return the letter to the sender, or to telegraph the
office of the addressee, whose postmaster must return it to the mailing
postmaster if delivery has not been made.4 Due to these changes in the
postal regulations5 there is now authority that the sender has the
6
power and the right to recover a letter before its delivery.
However, as the court pointed out in the principal case,7 the "loss
of control" argument is valid only to the extent that loss of control is
the significant element in the "Adams v. Lindsell Doctrine."
Significantly, the factor of the offeree's loss of control of his
acceptance is not mentioned in Adams v. Lindsell, the origin of the
rule. At that time the subjective theory of contracts wholly obtained
and it was considered essential to the formation of a contract that
"the minds of the parties meet" on the same proposal at the same
time.8 Since this would be impossible in contracts by correspondence,
the fiction was indulged that the offeror was to be deemed "mentally
1 1 Williston, Contracts § 70 (3rd ed. 1957).

2 1 Barn. & Aid. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818).
3 Simpson, Contracts § 28 (1954).
4 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 52 (1963).

GIt has been erroneously stated by some courts and textwriters that the power
to regain a mailed letter was originally granted by the postal regulations of 1913.
However, even prior to the postal regulations of 1913 a right of withdrawing
letters from the mail, similar to that now prevailing existed under the Postal Laws
and Regulations of 1893 (§H 487 and 1125) and 1902 (§§ 578 and 872) and, as
construcd by the Post Office Department, no substantial change was made with
regard
6 to such right by the regulations of 1913. 92 A.L.R. 1062 (1934).

Rhode Island Tool Co. v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 417 (1955).
v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 326 (1949).
7 Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 So. 2d 889, 897 (Fla. 1963).
s Simpson, Contracts § 28 (1954).
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repeating his offer every instant of the time the letter is traveling,
and then the contract is completed by the acceptance, i.e., by the
overt act of posting the letter of acceptance."9 No reference was made
in American cases of loss of control until the 1880 case of Mactir's
Adm r v. Frith.10
Thus, the element of loss of control was introduced, not as a
primary legal requisite to the existence of a contract, but as a factual
matter affecting the sufficiency of the manifestation of assent. 'Whereas Frith had made "loss of contror an operative fact, later courts
tended to make this the operative fact of conclusive legal significance.'
The unjustified significance placed on loss of control follows from
two errors. The first error is failure to distinguish between relinquishment of control as a factual element of manifest intent, which it is,
and as the legal predicate for completion of a contract, which it is not.
The second error lies in confusing the power to recall mail with the
right to repudiate acceptance. In short, the power to recall mail is a
factor, among many others, which may be significant in determining
when acceptance is effective, but the right to effectively withdraw and
repudiate an acceptance must be dependent upon the initial determina2
tion of when that acceptance is effective and irrevocable.1
From the foregoing it is clear that a change in postal regulations
does not, ipso facto, alter or affect the validity of the rule in Adams v.
Lindsell.
There is the premise in the "Adams v. Lindsell Doctrine" that there
must be, both in practical and conceptual terms, a point in time
when a contract is complete. The justification for the rule proceeds
from this premise. According to Professor Corbin, expediency determines this point:
We can choose either rule; but we must choose one. We can put the
risk on either party; but we must not leave it in doubt. The party not
carrying the risk can then act promptly and with confidence in reliance
on the contract; the person carrying the risk can insure against it if he
so desires. The business community could no doubt adjust itself to
either rule, but the rule throwing the risk on the offeror has the merit
of closing the deal more quickly and enabling performance more
promptly. It must be remembered that in the vast majority of cases the
acceptance is neither lost nor delayed, and promptness of action is
important to all of them. 1a

In the words of the court, "ultimately then the weight given the
reliance-expectation factors determine the view adopted as to the
9Ibid.

10 6 Wend. 103, 21 Am. Dec. 262 (1830).
11Dulop v. Higgens, 1 H.L.C. 381, 9 Eng. Rep. 805 (1848).
12 Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 So. 2d 889, 901 (Fla. 1963).
13 1 Corbin, Contracts § 78 (1950).
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deposited acceptance rule. Weighing the arguments with reference not
to specific cases but to a rule of general application and recognizing
the general and traditional acceptance of the rule as well as the
modem changes in effective long-distance communication, it would
seem that the balance tips whether heavily or near imperceptively, to
continued adherence to the 'Rule in Adams v. Lindsell'." 4
James L. Avritt

LIEN-NECESSrrY

OF FILING STATEMiENT

OF LABOR AND

MATEmuALS

Fui masmD oR To BE Fumsmm BEFoRE DEE Is REcoRDED By PtmcHAsER.-The defendants and a building contractor signed a contract
of sale on May 7, 1957, for the construction of a house on land then
owned by the builder. Conveyance of title was to take place upon
completion of construction, with defendants paying the balance of the
purchase price at that time. The house was completed early in July
and on July 8, 1957, the transaction was closed with conveyance by
the builder and with complete payment by defendants. During the
first week of October defendants contacted plaintiff, a plumbing
contractor, and he proceeded to correct a substantial defect in the
plumbing work he had done under contract with the builder. Plaintiff
had not been paid by the builder for his original work. On December
11, 1957, plaintiff notified defendants of his intention to hold their
property liable for his claim as required by Ky. Rev. Stat. 376.010(3)
[Hereinafter referred to as KRS] and filed a statement of his lien
laim in the county clerk's office as required by KRS 376.010(2). This
was the first actual notice to defendants that plaintiff had not been
paid.
In this action to enforce the lien the chancellor held that defendants, as equitable titleholders, had been "owners" of the property
within the meaning of KRS 376.010(1) since May 7, 1957, and were
not intervening bona fide purchasers for value and without notice.
Therefore, he ruled that defendants were not entitled to protection
under KRS 376.010(2); that the work done in October was the last
work done under the plumbing contract; and that the notice given to
defendants on December 11, 1957, complied with KRS 376.010(3).
Accordingly, the chancellor sustained the lien. Held: Reversed. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals held that when the balance of the
purchase price was paid and the deed recorded on July 8, 1957,
defendants became bona fide purchasers for value and without notice
14

Morrison v. Thoelke, 155

So. 2d 889, 904 (1963).

